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PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS WITH
ACCOUNTANTS: THE DEMISE OF UNITED
STATES V. KOVEL
I. INTRODUCTION
In handling complex financial transactions, particularly those with
significant tax implications, attorneys often need the advice and
assistance of accountants to competently represent their clients.
Accountants help lawyers understand the financial and tax implications
in a variety of transactions, but are particularly helpful in tax-
advantaged transactions, sometimes referred to as tax shelters.' Absent
such assistance, attorneys would be forced to proceed without a
complete understanding of the tax implications and risks of a particular
transaction. The advice and assistance of an accountant, however, is
valuable only to the extent that an attorney can have "full and frank"2
discussions with an accountant without fear that such communications
will be discovered by outsiders, particularly the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS).
Forty years ago, in the landmark case of United States v. Kovel,' the
Second Circuit extended the attorney-client privilege to include
communications an attorney has with an accountant to assist the
attorney in understanding the client's financial information. In that
case, the court analogized the accountant's role to that of an
interpreter.4 The law is well-established that if an attorney needs an
interpreter to understand his client, the presence of the interpreter will
not vitiate the attorney-client privilege.5 According to the Second
Circuit, the tax laws can be as incomprehensible as a foreign language to
many lawyers;6 "[h]ence the presence of an accountant... while the
client is relating a complicated tax story to the lawyer, ought not destroy
1. The Internal Revenue Code defines a "tax shelter" as "a partnership or other entity,
any investment plan or arrangement, or any other plan or arrangement, if a significant
purpose of such partnership, entity, plan, or arrangement is the avoidance or evasion of
Federal income tax." I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(iii) (West 2002).
2. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,392 (1981).
3. 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961).
4. Id. at 921.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 922.
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the privilege .... ",
The attorney-client privilege, however, is valuable only to the extent
it is predictable. Any uncertainty in the law will render the privilege
virtually worthless because no competent attorney would engage in
confidential communications with a client or a representative of a client
unless he were certain the privilege would apply.8 Despite the holding in
Kovel, certainty no longer exists with regard to communications
between and among a client, the client's attorney, and the client's
accountant. Over the past four decades, courts have repeatedly
narrowed the holding in Kovel. As a result, there is very little
protection left for communications with accountants, and the little
protection remaining is often confusing and unpredictable.
This Comment will first examine the attorney-client privilege,
focusing on the issue of whether the presence of a third party during
attorney-client communications breaches the confidentiality necessary
for the privilege to apply. Second, this Comment will analyze Internal
Revenue Code (I.R.C.) section 7525, the statute purporting to create a
limited accountant-client privilege for certain tax matters. Part IV of
this Comment will examine the ever-dwindling protection the attorney-
client privilege affords accountants. In Part V, this Comment will
briefly examine the protection that the work product doctrine affords
accountants that are employed by attorneys. Finally, this Comment will
call upon courts to reinstate the holding in Kovel, due to the limited
applicability of section 7525.
II. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
According to common law, the attorney-client privilege is "the
oldest of the privileges for confidential communications .... 9
According to Upjohn Co. v. United States, "[i]ts purpose is to encourage
full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and
thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and
7. Id.
8. An attorney is also obligated to protect confidential client information. MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2002). "A lawyer shall not reveal information
relating to representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation, except for
disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation .... " Id.
Model Rule 1.6, unlike the common law attorney-client privilege doctrine, is inapplicable,
however, in a litigation context. It is not a defense to a summons or subpoena, and it may not
be used as a privilege in discovery or at trial. Id. at cmt. 5.
9. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290 (John T. McNaughton ed. 1961).
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administration of justice. "'0 Its presence therefore helps to ensure that
clients "seeking legal advice will be able to confide fully and freely in
[their] attorney[s], secure in the knowledge that [their] confidences will
not later be... exposed to public view to [their] embarrassment or legal
detriment."" However, this privilege is not only designed "to protect...
the giving of professional advice to those who can act on it but also the
giving of information to the lawyer to enable him to give sound and
informed advice. ,12
To be protected as a privileged communication, information must be
communicated to an attorney for the purpose of securing legal advice. 3
Therefore, a discussion with an attorney concerning business advice will
not be considered privileged. 4 Communications are protected under the
attorney-client privilege if: (1) a person is seeking legal advice from a
lawyer acting in his legal capacity; (2) the communication is made for
the purpose of obtaining legal advice; (3) the communication is made in
confidence; and (4) the communication is made by the client.
The attorney-client privilege is centered around the requirement
that, in order to be protected, "the communication [must] be made in
confidence .... " 6  However, this "privilege shields only those
communications... to an attorney that [are] intended to be
confidential."'' Thus, the privilege is generally inapplicable if the
communication takes place in the presence of third parties. However,
the presence of a third party will not vitiate the attorney-client privilege
if the third party is an agent of the attorney or the client "whose
intervention is necessary to secure and facilitate the communication
between attorney and client.... .""
Determining which agents are necessary to secure and facilitate
communication between an attorney and a client is a fact-sensitive
10. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390.
11. Fin. Tech. Int'l, Inc. v. Smith, 49 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 961, 964 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting
Priest v. Hennessy, 409 N.E.2d 983, 985 (N.Y. 1980)).
12. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390.
13. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 2296, at 566-67.
14. United States v. Vehicular Parking, Ltd., 52 F. Supp. 751,753-54 (D. Del. 1943).
15. United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 538 n.9 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting
WIGMORE, supra note 9, § 2292 at 554); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 68 (2002).
16. United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 922 (2d Cir. 1961) (emphasis omitted).
17. United States v. Evans, 113 F.3d 1457,1462 (7th Cir. 1997).
18. Id.
19. Fin. Tech. Int'l, Inc. v. Smith, 49 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 961, 967 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (quoting
Mileski v. Locker, 178 N.Y.S.2d 911, 916 (Sup. Ct. 1958)).
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inquiry and thus difficult to predict. Nonetheless, certain principles can
be gleaned from the case law. For instance, courts have held that the
presence of certain types of third parties, such as a client's translator,20
interpreter,2' parent,22 or adult child23 may be necessary to secure and
facilitate communication between the client and his attorney. In many
instances, there could be no "full and frank"2' communication between
an attorney and client without the presence of these third parties
because they literally convey and translate information from the client
to the attorney.2 By contrast, courts have held that the presence of
other types of third parties, such as investment bankers or business
advisors, are generally unnecessary to secure and facilitate
communication between an attorney and client.2 These third parties
generally do not translate information from the client to the attorney;
rather, they provide information independently to the attorney.27 As
such, their presence breaches the confidentiality necessary to invoke the
attorney-client privilege.2" The question this Comment addresses is
whether the presence of an accountant retained to assist an attorney in a
complex tax-advantaged transaction is necessary to secure and facilitate
communication between an attorney and a client and thus is protected
by the attorney-client privilege.
III. I.R.C. § 7525
Congress ostensibly answered this question when it enacted section
7525(a) of the I.R.C., which provides:
[W]ith respect to tax advice, the same common law protections of
confidentiality which apply to a communication between a
taxpayer and an attorney shall also apply to a communication
20. Kovel, 296 F.2d at 921.
21. Mileski, 178 N.Y.S.2d at 915.
22. Hendrick v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 944 F. Supp. 187, 189 (W.D.N.Y. 1996).
23. Stroh v. Gen. Motors Corp., 623 N.Y.S.2d 873, 875 (App. Div. 1995).
24. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 389, 392 (1981).
25. See United States v. Evans, 113 F.3d 1457, 1462 (7th Cir. 1997); Kovel, 296 F.2d at
921; Fin. Tech. Int'l, Inc. v. Smith, 49 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 961, 967 (S.D.N.Y 2000) (quoting
Mileski, 178 N.Y.S.2d at 916).
26. United States v. Ackert, 169 F.3d 136, 139 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that the presence
of investment banker vitiates the attorney-client privilege); Cavallaro v. United States, 153 F.
Supp. 2d 52, 59 (D. Mass. 2001) (holding that the presence of accountants for children's
business vitiates parent's attorney-client privilege).
27. See Ackert, 169 F.3d 136; Cavarallo, 153 F. Supp. 2d 52.
28. See Ackert, 169 F.3d 136; Cavarallo, 153 F. Supp. 2d 52.
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between a taxpayer and any federally authorized tax practitioner
to the extent the communication would be considered a
privileged communication if it were between a taxpayer and an
attorney.29
A "federally authorized tax practitioner" is defined as any person
authorized to practice before the Internal Revenue Service, including
some accountants.3° Section 7525 is designed to place accountants on
par with attorneys as far as privileged communications are concerned.3
Section 7525, however, has three significant limitations. First, it does
not apply to criminal tax matters.32 Second, it does "not apply to any
written communication between a federally authorized tax practitioner
and a director, shareholder, officer, or employee, agent, or
representative of a corporation in connection with the promotion of the
direct or indirect participation of such corporation in any tax shelter. ,3
For purposes of this exception, the term "tax shelter" means "a
partnership or other entity, any investment plan or arrangement, or any
other plan or arrangement, if a significant purpose of such partnership,
entity, plan, or arrangement is the avoidance or evasion of Federal
income tax. "' Finally, section 7525, by its terms, applies only to
communications between a federally authorized tax practitioner and a
35taxpayer. It is unclear whether it applies to communications between a
taxpayer's federally authorized tax practitioner and the taxpayer's
attorney. Considering these limitations, section 7525 is no substitute for
the protection afforded by Kovel, particularly when an attorney seeks
the advice and assistance of an accountant in connection with a tax-
advantaged transaction.
IV. ACCOUNTANTS AND THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Aside from the limited protection afforded by I.R.C. § 7525, there is
no accountant-client privilege in federal court. However, under certain
29. I.R.C. § 7525(a)(1) (West 2002).
30. Id. § 7525(a)(3)(A).
31. Id. § 7525(a) (stating that the tax advisor privilege applies to the same extent as
attorney-client privilege).
32. Id. § 7525(a)(2).
33. Id. § 7525(b). The protection prescribed by section 7525(a) apparently applies to
oral communications related to corporate tax shelters and to all communications related to
non-corporate tax shelters.
34. Id. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(iii).
35. Id. § 7525(a).
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circumstances the attorney-client privilege can extend to shield
communications to accountants when the purpose of the communication
is to assist the attorney in rendering advice to the client. The leading
case in this area is United States v. Kovel, 6 in which the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit extended the attorney-client
privilege to shield communications by an attorney's client to an
accountant hired by the attorney to assist the attorney in understanding
the client's financial information. The court analogized the accountant's
role to that of an interpreter." If an attorney needs an interpreter to
understand his client, the presence of the interpreter will not destroy the
attorney-client privilege." The tax laws can be as incomprehensible as a
foreign language to a lawyer.39
The Kovel court stressed, however, that not all accountants are
included within the protection of the attorney-client privilege:
What is vital to the privilege is that the communication be made
in confidence for the purpose of obtaining legal advice from the
lawyer. If what is sought is not legal advice but only accounting
service.., or if the advice sought is the accountant's rather than
the lawyer's, no privilege exists."
For all practical purposes, Kovel extended the attorney-client
privilege to include communications between a lawyer and an
accountant when those communications are intended to assist the
lawyer in representing his client. The protection prescribed in Kovel,
moreover, applies to all types of transactions, including tax-advantaged
transactions.4 Over the past four decades, however, the holding in
Kovel has been restricted in several ways. As a result, there is no longer
any certainty that communications between a lawyer and an accountant
will be protected by the attorney-client privilege. The restrictions
imposed on Kovel are examined below.
A. Elements of the Attorney-Client Privilege: Strict Compliance Required
The party claiming the benefit of the attorney-client privilege has
36. 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961).
37. Id. at 921.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 922; see also supra note 6 and accompanying text.
40. 296 F.2d at 922 (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted).
41. Id. at 921-24.
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"the burden of proving all [of the] essential elements. 42 In United States
v. Adlman,43 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
specifically addressed the circumstances under which an attorney's
consultation with an accountant will subject reports prepared by the
accountant to the attorney-client privilege. In that case, the taxpayer,
Sequa Corporation, was contemplating a reorganization that would
result in a very large tax loss." In deciding whether to pursue the
reorganization, Adiman, an attorney and Sequa's vice president for
taxes, hired Arthur Andersen (AA) to prepare a memorandum
discussing the probable tax consequences of the proposed
restructuring. 5  Adlman relied on the memorandum in making
recommendations to the corporation and included AA's
recommendations as to the form of the transaction in a letter to Sequa's
vice president for finance. 46 AA later formalized the analysis in the
memorandum by issuing two opinion letters in which it evaluated the
reorganization and concluded that it "should result in a substantial [tax]
loss for Sequa."47 Adlman claimed that the two AA memoranda were
prepared for the purpose of assisting him in providing legal advice to
Sequa.4 ' The court disagreed, and its findings are quite instructive:
The problem with Adlman's argument is that the facts are
subject to competing interpretations. In many respects, the
evidence supports the conclusion that Sequa consulted an
accounting firm for tax advice, rather than that Adlman, as
Sequa's counsel, consulted AA to help him reach the
understanding he needed to furnish legal advice. Adlman
himself serves not only as counsel to Sequa but also as one of its
officers. AA, furthermore, is regularly employed by Sequa to
furnish auditing, accounting, and advisory services. AA furnished
extensive advisory services to Sequa in connection with the
merger, including tax advice. If the facts were that Sequa
furnished information to AA to seek AA's expert advice on the
tax im lications of the proposed transaction, no privilege would
apply.
42. United States v. Evans, 113 F.3d 1457, 1461 (7th Cir. 1997).
43. 68 F.3d 1495 (2d Cir. 1995).




48. Id. at 1498.
49. Id. at 1500 (emphasis added); see also Cavallaro v. United States, 153 F. Supp. 2d 53,
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As Adlman illustrates, the party claiming protection under the
attorney-client privilege has the burden of proving each of the elements
of such privilege." This requires contemporaneous proof5' of a Kovel
agreementC In many instances, this could mean that determining
whether the attorney-client privilege applies to communications with
accountants involves analyzing form over substance. 3 Therefore, those
who "paper" the file with the right agreements and billing statements
will succeed, while those who are a bit sloppy will not, despite the true
nature of the relationship between the lawyer, accountant, and client.
B. Client Communication: Accountant as Translator of Information
If an accountant is retained by a law firm, communications with the
accountant will be covered by the attorney-client privilege only if the
accountant's function is "to make a literal translation" of information
from the client to the lawyer. 4 In United States v. Ackert,55 an
investment banker (Ackert) with Goldman, Sachs approached
Paramount with a tax-advantaged investment proposal. 6 During the
negotiations, Meyers, Paramount's senior vice president and tax
counsel, contacted Ackert on several occasions to discuss various
aspects of the proposal, including its tax consequences. Meyers
claimed that these conversations were necessary to "advise Paramount
about the tax implications of the proposed investment."58 Paramount
ultimately chose to accept the proposal, but they selected a different
investment banker than Ackert However, they still paid Goldman,
58 (D. Mass. 2001) (finding that the attorney-client privilege did not apply to communications
with Ernst & Young where the retention letter between Ernst and the client provided that
"[all advice and other service [Ernst & Young] provide[s] pursuant to this engagement are
solely for the benefit of [the client] and are not for the benefit of anyone other than the
[client] or its shareholders."); Gregory J. Wallance, How to Waive Privilege Without Really
Trying, 12 CORP. COUNS. 4 (1997) (arguing that the use of a corporation's regular auditor as
a Kovel consultant waives the attorney-client privilege).
50. Adlman, 68 F.3d at 1500.
51. A separate and detailed retention agreement or separate billing are examples of
contemporaneous proof.
52. See Adlman, 68 F.3d at 1500 n.1.
53. Id.
54. United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961).
55. 169 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 1999).
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Sachs $1.5 million for their services.6
During a subsequent audit, Ackert was summoned to testify about
his involvement in the investment proposal.61 "Paramount asserted the
attorney-client privilege with respect to questions concerning any
conversations Ackert had with Meyers," claiming that Ackert played a
role similar to that of the accountant in Kovel.62 The district court
upheld Paramount's claim of privilege. 63 The Second Circuit reversed,
ruling:
We also reject Paramount's argument based on Kovel. That
decision recognized that the inclusion of a third party in
attorney-client communications does not destroy the privilege if
the purpose of the third party's participation is to improve the
comprehension of the communications between attorney and
client. That principle, however, has no application to this case.
Meyers was not relying on Ackert to translate or interpret
information given to Meyers by his client. Rather, Meyers
sought out Ackert for information Paramount did not have about
the proposed transaction and its tax consequences. Because
Ackert's role was not as a translator or interpreter of client
communications, the principle of Kovel does not shield his
discussions with Meyers. '
Similarly, in Calvin Klein Trademark Trust v. Wachner,65 a case
involving a public relations firm rather than an accounting firm, the
court further limited the scope of Kovel. In Calvin Klein, the law firm of
Boies, Schiller & Flexner L.L.P. (BSF) retained the public relations firm
of Robinson Lerer & Montgomery (RLM) "to act as a consultant to
[BSF] for certain communications services in connection with [BSF's]
representation of Calvin Klein, Inc. [(CKI)]. '' 66 CKI claimed that the
communications between BSF and RLM were protected by the
attorney-client privilege because the communications were needed by
BSF to formulate legal advice.67 The court rejected this argument,
holding that "the possibility that communications between RLM and
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 138-39.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 139-40.
65. 198 F.R.D. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).




BSF may help the latter formulate legal advice is not in itself sufficient
to implicate the privilege: 'the privilege protects communications
between a client and an attorney, not communications that prove
important to an attorney's legal advice to a client.'"'68 The court also
rejected CKI's Kovel argument:
[E]ven assuming arguendo that somewhere hidden in the
voluminous documents here in issue are nuggets of client
confidential communications that were originally made for the
purpose of seeking legal advice, their disclosure to RLM waives
the privilege, since inspection of the documents here in question
clearly establishes that RLM, far from serving the kind of
"translator" function served by the accountant in Kovel, supra, is,
at most, simply providing ordinary public relations advice ....
The possibility that such activity may also have been helpful to
BSF in formulating legal strategy is neither here nor there if
RLM's work and advice simply serves to assist counsel in
assessing the probable public reaction to various strategic
alternatives, as opposed to enabling counsel to understand
aspects of the client's own communications that could not
otherwise be appreciated in the rendering of legal advice. 9
Thus, under Ackert and Calvin Klein, communications with an
accountant are privileged only if the accountant is retained solely to
translate and interpret information conveyed by the client to the law
firm. Although one of the roles an accountant serves is to "interpret"
client financial and tax information for an attorney, an accountant also
provides independent information and expertise for the attorney to use
in representing his or her client. This latter communication, according
to Ackert and Calvin Klein, is not protected by the attorney-client
privilege. Therefore, Ackert and Calvin Klein severely limit the
protection afforded by Kovel.
68. Id.(quoting United States v. Ackert, 169 F.3d 136, 139 (2d Cir. 2000)).
69. Id. at 54-55. But see Byrnes v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, No. 98 Civ. 8520
(BSJ) (MHD), 1999 WL 1006312, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 1999) (mem.) (holding that
communications between actuary and attorneys are privileged). Ackert is distinguishable
because it was not apparent who hired the accounting firm, nor what capacity they were
acting in to assist with legal services, whereas "here the Segal Company was involved as a
consultant on the very project for which the attorney was also rendering assistance to
Empire." Id.
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C. Functional Equivalent of Client Employee
If an accountant is retained by the client (as opposed to by the law
firm), communications between the lawyer and the accountant will be
included within the attorney-client privilege only if the accountant acts
as the functional equivalent of an employee of the client. In In re
Copper Market Antitrust Litigation," a Japanese manufacturer
(Sumitomo) retained the same public relations firm, RLM, as in Calvin
Klein "to handle public relations matters arising from the copper trading
scandal."7 Sumitomo did not have public relations employees who were
fluent in English or knowledgeable about United States litigation.72
RLM worked out of Sumitomo's Tokyo headquarters and was given
unfettered authority to speak on behalf of Sumitomo.73 During the
litigation, Sumitomo's lawyers frequently conferred with RLM.7 The
plaintiffs sought all documents relating to RLM's consulting work.75
Sumitomo claimed that some of these documents were privileged.76 The
plaintiffs argued that Ackert governed this dispute and there was
therefore no privilege.7 The court found that:
RLM was, essentially, incorporated into Sumitomo's staff to
perform a corporate function that was necessary in the context of
the government investigation, actual and anticipated private
litigation, and heavy press scrutiny obtaining at the time.
Sumitomo retained RLM to deal with public relations problems
following the exposure of the copper trading scandal.
Sumitomo's internal resources were insufficient to cover the
task.... [Thus,] for purposes of the attorney-client privilege,
RLM can fairly be equated with Sumitomo for purposes of
analyzing... communications to which RLM was a party
concerning its scandal-related duties. Accordingly, confidential
communications between RLM and Sumitomo's counsel, or
between RLM and Sumitomo, or among RLM, Sumitomo's in-
house counsel and [outside counsel] that were made for the
purpose of facilitating the rendition of legal services to
Sumitomo can be protected from disclosure by the attorney-
70. 200 F.R.D. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
71. Id. at 215.
72. Id.








By analogy, if an accountant is retained by a client, as opposed to by
a law firm, communications between the accountant and the client's
lawyers will be privileged only if the accountant is found to be the
functional equivalent of an employee of the client.79 This would be a
difficult standard to meet in most cases, as accountants are generally
required to act as independent contractors and would not be considered
to hold the same status as an employee of a client." Copper Market
further restricts the protection afforded by Kovel.
D. Pre-Retention Communications With Accountant
Prior to the time an accountant enters into a Kovel agreement,
communications with the accountant are not privileged.8 Thus, any
communications the accountant has with the client prior to the retention
of the law firm are not privileged. The privilege, if any, does not arise
until after the accountant enters into a Kovel agreement with the law
firm.
E. Summary of Protection of Accountant Communications
In the forty years since Kovel was decided, courts have repeatedly
restricted the protection that it afforded communications among clients,
lawyers, and accountants. Adlman requires strict compliance with the
elements of the attorney-client privilege, as well as detailed
contemporaneous proof of such compliance.82 Ackert and Calvin Klein
restrict Kovel to situations in which the accountant acts solely as a
translator of information from the client to the lawyer.83 Copper Market,
for all practical purposes, requires that the accountant be retained by
78. Id. at 219; see also In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 929 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that, because
the independent real estate consultant was a functional equivalent of an employee of the
client, communications between the consultant and the lawyers were privileged).
79. Copper Mkt., 200 F.R.D. 213.
80. Id.
81. In re Grand Jury Proceedings Under Seal, 947 F.2d 1188, 1190-91 (4th Cir. 1991)
(holding that attorney-client privilege does not protect communications with a consultant
prior to a Kovel arrangement); United States v. Cote, 326 F. Supp. 444, 449-50 (D. Minn.
1971) (holding that the attorney-client privilege does not apply to an accountant who was
employed by the client eight years before attorney was retained), aff'd, 456 F.2d 142 (8th Cir.
1972); see also Summit, Ltd. v. Levy, 111 F.R.D. 40,41-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (same).
82. United States v. Adlman, 68 F.3d 1495, 1500 (2d Cir. 1995).
83. United States v. Ackert, 169 F.3d 136, 139 (2d Cir. 1999); Calvin Klein Trademark
Trust v. Wachner, 198 F.R.D. 53,54 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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the law firm, as opposed to the client.' Further, In re Grand Jury
Proceedings Under Seal requires that the client retain the law firm
before retaining the accountant. 5 These cases epitomize form over
substance, and have done nothing but create uncertainty and confusion
in an area of the law in which certainty is crucial.
V. WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE
A. Work Product Doctrine Generally
The attorney-client privilege is not the only protection available to
communications among clients, lawyers, and accountants. The work
product doctrine also provides protection, as it "shelters the mental
processes of the attorney, providing a privileged area within which he
can analyze and prepare his client's case."8  According to the
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers: "Work product
consists of tangible material or its intangible equivalent in unwritten or
oral form, other than underlying facts, prepared by a lawyer for
litigation then in progress or in reasonable anticipation of future
litigation."' The doctrine essentially shields communications and other
material prepared in anticipation of litigation; it is distinct from the
attorney-client privilege and may be applied in circumstances when the
attorney-client privilege does not apply." The doctrine protects an
attorney's "pattern of investigation,.... determination of relevant facts,
preparation of legal theories, planning of strategy, and recording of
mental impressions."89 The doctrine also applies to information and
materials prepared by a party representative working on behalf of the
attorney, or gathered by an agent acting under an attorney's direction. °
The attorney work product doctrine is at once broader and narrower
than the attorney-client privilege. The work product doctrine "extend[s]
to information which an attorney secures from a witness while acting for
his client."'" It encompasses "memoranda, briefs, communications and
other writings prepared by counsel for his own use," while the attorney-
84. See Copper Mkt., 200 F.R.D. at 217-20.
85. 947 F.2d at 1191.
86. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975).
87. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 136 (1996).
88. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
89. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 622 F.2d 933, 935 (6th Cir. 1980) (quoting Hickman, 329
U.S. at 511; Besly-Welles Corp. v. Balax, Inc., 43 F.R.D. 368, 371 (E.D. Wis. 1968)).
90. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 603 (8th Cir. 1977).
91. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 508.
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client privilege generally does not.92 In addition, the attorney-client
privilege is inapplicable to "writings ... reflect[ing] an attorney's mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories.'9 However, these
writings are included within the protection of the work product
doctrine.9
Although the work product doctrine protects a much wider category
of materials than the attorney-client privilege, its protection is not
absolute. A party may obtain discovery of materials otherwise
protected by the work product doctrine if the party seeking discovery
can demonstrate that it has a substantial need for the materials in the
preparation of its case and that it is unable, without undue hardship, to
obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means.95 This
holding has been specifically incorporated into Rule 26(b)(3) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.96 However, even upon a showing of
substantial need and undue hardship, the courts are required to protect
"opinion work product"-work product reflecting the attorney's mental
processes-from disclosure to an adversary.97 Opinion work product is
discoverable only upon a showing beyond substantial need and undue
hardship. This standard has sometimes been described as being
between very high and absolute.98
The "substantial need and undue hardship exception" has not been
specifically adopted, however, in the Tax Court's Rules of Practice and
Procedure. The notes of the Rules Committee regarding Rule 70(b),
which governs discovery in the Tax Court, state that work product is
"generally intended to be outside the scope of allowable discovery. ",99 In
P. T. & L. Construction Co. v. Commissioner,'°° the Tax Court took
particular note of the "negative recognition" given to the work product
doctrine in the Court's Rules and the Rules Committee's notes.''
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 511.
95. Id. at 508-09.
96. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). The generally accepted view is that the IRS bears a
reduced burden to show necessity. See, e.g., United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 496 F.
Supp. 1152, 1158 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 677 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1982),
affd in part and rev'd in part, 465 U.S. 805 (1984).
97. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 400-02 (1981).
98. Id.
99. 60 T.C. 1097,1098 (1973).
100. 63 T.C. 404 (1974).
101. Id. at 408.
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Moreover, in Zaentz v. Commissioner,02 the Tax Court flatly stated that
"under the Tax Court Rules, the work product of counsel is not
discoverable." 3 However, the Tax Court recently held that "[t]he work
product privilege is a qualified one that, in some circumstances, may be
overcome by a showing of good cause and substantial need."'0 4 It is
important to note that, while the Tax Court's rules apply to pretrial
discovery in matters tried before that court, Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure applies to trials in the district court, the Court
of Federal Claims, and to summons enforcement actions in the district
court.
The most significant limitation on the work product doctrine is the
requirement that, in order to be protected, information must have been
obtained or produced "in anticipation of litigation."'0 ' Litigation does
not need to have commenced or be immediately imminent at the time
the materials are produced so "long as the primary motivating purpose
behind the creation of the document[s] was to aid in possible future
litigation.', 0 6 In Upjohn Co. v. United States, for example, documents
that had been prepared in anticipation of future litigation were held to
be protected work product even though no lawsuits had been
commenced or even threatened at the time of creation. 'O However, "a
remote prospect of future litigation" is not sufficient to invoke the work
product doctrine.0 ' In tax litigation, whether a notice of deficiency has
been issued is not determinative of whether documents were prepared
in anticipation of litigation."
Courts differ concerning whether the work product doctrine applies
to materials prepared in anticipation of prior litigation sought by an
opponent in subsequent litigation."0 The "in anticipation of litigation"
requirement also raises the question of what constitutes litigation for
purposes of the work product doctrine. For example, the work product
doctrine has been held not to apply to materials prepared in anticipation
102. 73 T.C. 469 (1979).
103. Id. at 478.
104. Ames v. Comm'r, 112 T.C. 304, 310 (1999).
105. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
106. United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194, 1502 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v. Davis,
636 F.2d 1028, 1040 (5th Cir. 1981).
107. 449 U.S. 383, 386-87,397-402 (1981).
108. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 604 (8th Cir. 1977).
109. Bernardo v. Comm'r, 104 T.C. 677, 688 (1995).
110. Compare Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Tonka Corp., 140 F.R.D. 381 (D. Minn. 1992),
with Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Int'l Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 579 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. 1991).
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of an administrative proceeding before the IRS."'
B. Accountants and the Work Product Doctrine
Just as the attorney-client privilege applies only to communications
with an attorney or his agents, the work product doctrine extends only
to materials prepared or obtained by an attorney or his agents or
employees."' For example, in United States v. Nobles,' an investigator's
report prepared for an attorney in anticipation of litigation was held to
be protected work product."' Similarly, financial analyses can be
protected as work product if they are prepared by an accountant to
assist a lawyer in assessing a client's potential criminal liability."5
To be protected as work product, however, materials must have
been prepared for or transferred to an attorney in connection with the
rendering of legal advice."6 In addition, the same protection applies if
an attorney retains these materials to render legal advice. 7 Materials
cannot be "funneled" through an attorney simply to afford them
protection."' Likewise, "[a]n attorney may not be used to insulate
records an individual previously has prepared for his business.""' 9
However, materials gathered at an attorney's request by a client to allow
an accountant to prepare a report in anticipation of litigation are work
product, because an attorney's opinions and mental impressions would
ultimately be shown.' 20 In contrast, "[d]ocuments created by and
received from an unrelated third party and given by the client to his
attorney" are not protected by the work product doctrine unless the
production of those documents would somehow reveal the attorney's
thought-process or mental impressions.' Therefore, "since arbitrations
111. In re Special Sept. 1978 Grand Jury (II), 640 F.2d 49, 65 (7th Cir. 1980). The
Seventh Circuit has also declined to apply the work product doctrine to materials prepared
for a prior administrative proceeding unrelated to the case before it. Velsicol Chem. Corp. v.
Parsons, 561 F.2d 671, 676 (7th Cir. 1977). Likewise, in Peterson v. United States, the court
refused to extend work product protection to IRS appellate conferee and field agent reports.
52 F.R.D. 317 (S.D. Ill. 1971).
112. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225,238-39 (1975).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 238.
115. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 601 F.2d 162, 171 (5th Cir. 1979).
116. United States v. Clark, 847 F.2d 1467, 1471 (10th Cir. 1988).
117. Id.
118. Sneider v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 91 F.R.D. 1, 4 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
119. Grand Jury Proceedings, 601 F.2d at 171 n.7.
120. United States v. Bell, 95-1 T.C.M. (CCH) 50,006 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
121. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 959 F.2d 1158, 1165-66 (2d Cir. 1992).
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are adversarial in nature... documents prepared by or for a party in
connection with arbitrations should ordinarily be protected by the work
product doctrine. ,122 However, reports prepared by an accountant
engaged by an attorney to assist the attorney's client in preparing tax
returns are not privileged under either Rule 26(b)(4)(B) or the work
product doctrine. 3
Because the work product doctrine applies only to materials
prepared in anticipation of litigation, it provides little protection for
communications among a client, lawyer, and accountant in connection
with the planning and execution of a tax-advantaged transaction.
However, the protection of the work product doctrine has been held to
encompass documents, the primary purpose of which are "to assess the
desirability of a business transaction, which, if undertaken, would give
rise to the litigation.""2 4 In Adlman, the Second Circuit held that "a
document created because of anticipated litigation ... does not lose
work-product protection [under this formulation] merely because it is
intended to assist in the making of a business decision influenced by the
likely outcome of the anticipated litigation."125 Despite this holding, the
work product doctrine would generally not apply to communications
among a client, lawyer, and accountant in connection with the planning
and execution of a transaction.
C. Waiver
Unlike disclosure of materials protected by the attorney-client
privilege, disclosure of work product materials does not ordinarily result
in a waiver of the doctrine's protection. While disclosure of information
protected by the attorney-client privilege to anyone outside of the
privileged relationship ordinarily results in a waiver, disclosure of work
product materials to a third party results in a waiver only "if the
disclosure to a third party 'is inconsistent with the maintenance of
secrecy from the disclosing party's adversary.' ,126 Unlike the attorney-
client privilege, where a waiver generally extends to all communications
122. Samuels v. Mitchell, 155 F.R.D. 195, 200 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
123. Bell, 95-1 T.C.M. (CCH) 50,006.
124. United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194,1195 (2d Cir. 1998).
125. Id. The case was remanded with instructions to the district court to determine
whether the document was prepared "because of" expected litigation. Id. at 1203-04.
126. Minn. Sch. Bds. Ass'n Ins. Trust v. Employers Ins. Co. of Wausau, 183 F.R.D. 627,
631 (N.D. Il. 1999) (quoting United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C.
Cir. 1980)); see also Bramlette v. Hyundai Motor Co., No. 91-C3635, 1993 WL 338980, at *3
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 1993) (mem.).
20031
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
relating to the same subject matter, selective and strategic disclosure of
work product may be consistent with the doctrine; the purpose
underlying the work product doctrine does not involve confidential
communications as much as implementation of the adversarial process
and protection of the attorney's participation in it.
VI. CONCLUSION
Attorneys often need the advice and assistance of accountants to
competently represent clients. This is particularly true when attorneys
represent clients in tax-advantaged transactions. Attorneys can make
full use of the accountant's advice and expertise, however, only if the
attorneys can have confidential communications with the accountants.
Kovel recognized this fact. Since then, however, courts have limited the
protection Kovel provided to attorney-accountant communications. It is
time to reverse this situation.
The goal of I.R.C. § 7525 was to place accountants 6n par with
lawyers as far as confidential communications are concerned. That
section, however, does not apply to communications related to tax-
advantaged transactions. In addition, these transactions are not
protected under the work product doctrine. This is counterintuitive for
two reasons. First, there are some areas of tax law that accountants
know better than lawyers; tax shelters is one such area. Accountants
know precisely what is legal and what is not. The refusal to extend
section 7525 to tax shelters will not prevent such transactions. Rather, it
will merely force clients to consummate such transactions without the
expert advice of accountants. Second, why should the attorney-client
privilege protect tax shelter advice from an attorney to a client, but not
the same advice from an accountant? If section 7525 really intends to
place lawyers and accountants on par, this distinction makes no sense.
The I.R.C. should either include or exclude all communications between
clients and accountants from the protection of the attorney-client
privilege because the status quo simply encourages clients to retain
lawyers rather than accountants. As a result, it is time for the courts to
reinstate Kovel and, as such, bring needed certainty to a very uncertain
area of the law.
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